现代产业经济学系列讲座第215期

数字经济与产业发展创新系列研讨会

时间：2022年3月22日（周二）15:30-17:00

地点：复旦大学管理学院思源楼326室

题目：Market Transparency and Competitiveness in a Multi-Unit Auction: An experimental Study

主讲人：申培垚 上海科技大学助理教授

主持人：从佳佳 复旦大学管理学院 助理教授

摘要：Does a more transparent market lead to more competitive outcomes? We study this question with an experimental seller-side multi-unit auction inspired by electricity markets. The experiment is designed to include the different forms of market power that can arise in multi-unit auctions, as well as a changing level of competition. Our treatment variable is market transparency, where the information that is commonly available to sellers either about market demand or about other sellers' costs may change.

We find that a fully transparent market does not induce a more competitive outcome. On the contrary, limited information about other sellers leads to strictly lower average prices without negatively affecting the allocative efficiency of the auction. We explain this and other findings with a behavioral variant of supply function competition, where individual sellers act as if competing against the average market situation.

主讲人简介：上海科技大学助理教授，博士毕业于澳大利亚新南威尔士大学经济系，主要研究方向为环境经济学和实验经济学。她的工作探讨能源效率政策中的逆向选择问题，碳排放交易市场上信息审查机制的设计，以电力市场为例分析信息结构对多物品拍卖的影响，以及基于实地实验分析信息干预在清洁取暖方面如何帮助消费者做更好的决策。研究成果发表在《Environmental and Resource Economics》、《Economics Letters》等期刊。主持国家自然科学青年基金一项。

现代产业经济学系列讲座第216期

数字经济与产业发展创新系列研讨会

时间：2022年3月29日（周二）15:30-17:00

地点：腾讯在线会议

题目：Search prominence with costly product returns

主讲人：李三希 教授 中国人民大学经济学院

主持人：李玲芳 教授 复旦大学管理学院

摘要：Search prominence can be non-profitable under costly product returns. In a Hotelling model of duopoly competition, we show that, due to the presence of information externality, a non-prominent firm can free ride a prominent firm's return policy and make a higher profit. When firms can choose their return policies, a prominent firm will impose a more restrictive policy than a non-prominent firm. Moreover, when allowing product returns is compulsory, it can be a dominant strategy for both firms to choose a high search cost to avoid being prominent. Our results then demonstrate a complementary relationship between the advantage of search prominence and the cost of product returns. Furthermore, our main results are robust to various extensions.

主讲人简介：李三希，中国人民大学经济学院教授，中国人民大学数字经济研究中心主任，中国人民大学数字经济跨学科交叉平台首席专家，教育部青年长江学者，Journal of Economics副主编，《经济理论与经济管理》副主编。中国运筹学会博弈论分会副理事长，中国信息经济学会常务理事。研究领域为信息经济学、产业组织理论和数字经济，发表论文三十余篇，发表期刊包括Management Science、Journal of Economics Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Public Economics、《经济研究》、《经济学（季刊）》、《世界经济》、《中国工业经济》等，主持国家自科重大项目-课题、国家自科优青项目、国家自科面上项目、教育部人文社科项目等多项项目。