时间：2022年4月12日（周二）15:30-17:00

地点：腾讯在线会议

题目：The Core in Housing Markets with Indifferent Preferences

主讲人：张军 教授 南京审计大学

主持人：李玲芳 教授 复旦大学管理学院

会议号：392-945-827

摘要：In the housing market model, Shapley & Scarf (1974) and Roth & Postlewaite (1977) show that when agents’preferences are not strict, the strong core may be empty, while the nonempty weak core may be inefficient and larger than the set of intuitively reasonable allocations. We solve this problem by proposing two new core concepts through rectifying behavioral assumptions on the participation of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. The two cores are nonempty, efficient, and coincide with the strong core whenever the strong core is nonempty. We also generalize the concept of competitive allocations, and show that there exist competitive allocations in the two cores.

主讲人简介：Jun Zhang is a Professor of Economics at Nanjing Audit University. He obtained PhD degree in economics from California Institute of Technology. His research focuses on market design theory and application, with publications in American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and Journal of Mathematical Economics. He is also interested in behavioral economics and education.