时   间：2023年10月17日（周二）15:30-17:00

地   点：管理学院史带楼602室

题   目： Firm Transparency at Debt Rollover

主讲人：许海波（副研究员）  同济大学经济与管理学院

主持人：陆卓然 助理教授

摘   要：When firms seek funding for debt rollover, public signals (such as ratings) are available to external investors. A finer signal structure reduces the incumbent investor’s liquidity risk by mitigating information asymmetry but dissipates his information rents. Applying an information design approach, we show that an optimal pass-or-fail test, which not only partially reveals firm fundamentals but also affects firm behavior, maximizes firm ex-ante borrowing capacity, because it balances the incumbent investor’s liquidity risk and information rent dissipation. Among all signal structures that facilitate the firm to obtain an initial loan, a pass-or-fail test whose associated firm borrowing capacity equals firm borrowing need maximizes social welfare.

主讲人简介：许海波（副研究员）同济大学经济与管理学院,Washington University in St. Louis经济学博士，主要研究领域为博弈论、合约理论和公司金融。近期主要关注信息设计理论在数字经济和公司金融等领域的发展和运用。曾在The Review of Economics and Statistics、Games and Economic Behavior和《世界经济》等国内外期刊发表多篇论文。