时    间：2023年9月26日15:30-17:00（周二）

地    点：管理学院史带楼302室

题    目：Information Discrimination Through Market Segmentation

主讲人：Delong Meng,  assistant professor

主持人：陆卓然  助理教授

摘    要：

We study the welfare consequences of third-degree information discrimination. A sender persuades a receiver to take a costly action (out of two possible actions). The receiver's cost is her private information, and the sender observes a signal about this cost before disclosing information to the receiver. We map information discrimination (with two actions and linear utilities) to price discrimination with a lower bound on transfers. Market segmentation generally fails to restore efficiency, due to heterogeneous tax rates and horizontal differentiation. The receiver-optimal segmentation might strictly increase the sender's payoff relative to the initial market.  Finally, two byproducts of our study include ironing as concavification and public persuasion as a posted price.

个人简介：

Delong Meng is an assistant professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. His main research interest is in micro theory, particularly information design. He obtained his PhD from Stanford University in 2019.