时    间：2023年03月7日（周二）14:00-15:30

地    点：史带楼503室

题    目：Revision and Relation Dynamics

主讲人：Zhaoneng Yuan

主持人：李玲芳 教授

摘    要：

I study an infinitely repeated game between an agent and a principal, where the principal has the option to ask the agent to revise his work, and the revision is asked based on subjective evaluation. Revision can improve the output quality, but it also introduces incentive problems when the true motion of revision--whether out of efficiency or greed—is the principal’s private information. The optimal relational contract speaks to how the principal optimally manages the revision and how the relationship evolves over time. I show that the relationship starts with excessive revision but ends with insufficient revision. As time progresses, both the revision declines and the relationship deteriorates. Moreover, the principal gradually cedes her revision option as the agent gains control on his work.

个人简介：

Zhaoneng Yuan is a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the Business School, the University of Hong Kong. Her research focuses on applied microeconomic theory, and her work has been published in Management Science.