现代产业经济学系列讲座第200期

时间：2021年5月11日（周二）10:00-11:30

地点：复旦大学管理学院史带楼303室

题目：Type-contingent Information Disclosure

主讲人：朱曙光 上海财经大学经济学院 助理教授

主持人：陆卓然复旦大学管理学院 助理教授

摘要：We study a mechanism design problem where the principal can also manipulate the agent's information about a payoff-relevant state. Jointly designing information and allocation rule is proved equivalent to certain multi-dimensional screening problem. Based on this equivalence, when the agent's types are positively-related, full disclosure is proved optimal under regularity conditions; while with negatively-related types, the optimal disclosure policy takes the form of a bad-state alert, which is in general a type-contingent disclosure policy. In a binary environment, we fully characterize the optimal mechanisms and discuss when type-contingent disclosure strictly benefits the principal and its welfare consequences.

主讲人简介：Shuguang Zhu joined the School of Economics at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics after receiving his Ph.D. from Toulouse School of Economics in 2018. His current research lies in microeconomic theory including, but not restricted to, mechanism design theory, information design and collective decision-making. He has a paper recently accepted by the AEJ: Microeconomics.

现代产业经济学系列讲座第201期

时间：2021年5月12日（周三）13:30-15:30

地点：复旦大学管理学院史带楼303室

题目：How to Pick the Winner In a Promotion Contest? Theory and Experiment on Promotion Mechanisms and Individual Performance

主讲人：郑捷 清华大学经济管理学院 副教授

主持人：吴乐珍复旦大学管理学院 助理教授

摘要：Competition rules, peer opinions, and the personal preference of the manager are three main factors affecting promotions. To examine the effects of these three factors, we compare four promotion mechanisms in which the above three factors respectively dominate: (1) a promotion system based on Tullock contest; (2) a biased Tullock contest for promotion influenced by the preference of the manager; (3) a system where ingroup voting determines promotion; (4) an outgroup voting system of promotion. The current study suggests a model where all four mechanisms each represents a special case of the two-player asymmetric Tullock rent-seeking game with different values of r and f, where r is the discriminatory parameter in contest success function and f describes the bias towards the favored individual. We first investigate these different promotion mechanisms from the theoretical perspective and then design an experiment with five treatments each corresponding to one of the four scenarios and a control scenario where there is only piece-rate salary and no prize for promotion. The results of the experiment support most of the theoretical predictions. Our study suggests different impacts of four typical promotion designs on individual performance, and may assist institutions in designing promotion mechanisms.

主讲人简介：郑捷，清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授，博士生导师，清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任，清华大学互联网产业研究院产业学者。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编，Research in Economics副编，曾担任多份SSCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠利他等行为问题，通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体行为、多方互动、市场均衡。已有研究工作发表于American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名国际期刊，且有部分工作被收录入实验研究方法权威工具书Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology。