现代产业经济学系列讲座第197期

时间：2021年4月20日（周二）13:30-15:30

地点：复旦大学管理学院思源楼328室

题目：Industry-University Collaboration, and Chinese Firms' Innovation and Technology Commercialization

主讲人：周彤 上海科技大学创业与管理学院助理教授

主持人：邵翔复旦大学管理学院产业经济学系 助理教授

摘要：While industry-university collaboration (IUC) is an important mechanism to synergize universities’and industry’s research and development, whether and how this mechanism enhances corporate innovation in China remains unexplored in the literature. In this study, we construct a comprehensive dataset for the innovation and collaboration activities of 108 thousand industrial firms and 153 notable research universities and institutes from 1996 to 2013 in China. Measuring IUC with the occurrence and frequency of patents co-assigned to both firms and universities, we first document that firms with greater IUC produce more and better patent outputs. Instrumental regressions and dynamic difference-in-differences analysis support a causal interpretation of the effect. Further evidence suggests that our results can be attributed to two channels through which firms benefit from IUC: knowledge acquisition and talent recruitment. We also find that IUC leads to more new product sales, which highlights the role of university technologies in firms' innovation commercialization.

主讲人简介：周彤博士，上海科技大学创业与管理学院助理教授，香港大学金融学博士。他的研究论文主要关注技术创新和金融的互动关系，同时关注中国金融制度对实体经济发展的影响作用。

现代产业经济学系列讲座第198期

时间：2021年4月27日（周二）13:30-15:30

地点：复旦大学管理学院史带楼603室

题目：Optimal Bid Caps in Noisy Contests

主讲人：吴泽南 北京大学 助理教授

主持人：陆卓然复旦大学管理学院 助理教授

摘要：This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multi-player generalized lottery contest, in which a higher bid improves one's winning odds but does not ensure a win. The bid cap is allowed to be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright restrictions on players' bids, while the latter specifies a tax rate for every level of bid and generates tax revenue in equilibrium. A designer commits to the bid cap scheme prior to the competition to maximize a weighted sum between players' aggregate bid and the overall tax revenue she collects through the cap. Our analysis characterizes the properties of the optimum and spells out the conditions for the various optimal bid cap schemes. Our results stand in sharp contrast to studies based on two-player all-pay auctions (e.g., Che and Gale, 1998, 2006; Kaplan and Wettstein, 2006): We show that with a sufficiently noisy winner-selection mechanism, a rigid bid is always suboptimal regardless of the designer's preference, and no cap is optimal when the designer maximizes only the aggregate bid. Based on our analysis, we develop a rationale that bridges noisy contests and all-pay auctions and sheds light on the nature of bid caps in different contexts.

主讲人简介：Zenan Wu is an assistant professor at Peking University. His research focuses on the field of applied microeconomic theory; specifically, contest theory, insurance markets, and behavioral economics. His research has been published in journals, including Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, RAND Journal of Economics, and Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. He received the Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Tsinghua University in 2008 and Ph.D. in Economics from University of Pennsylvania in 2015.

现代产业经济学系列讲座第199期

时间：2021年4月28日（周三）13:30-15:30

地点：复旦大学管理学院史带楼603室

题目：Non-uniform housing price growth and urban planning

主讲人：卜南阳上海大学悉尼工商学院 助理教授

主持人：沈煌南复旦大学管理学院 助理教授

摘要：We develop a new model where cities are developed through“urban planning”. Specifically, besides the pre-existing traditional center, there may be new centers designated by the government. We study the interplay between labor market, residential choices, and land market. We show both theoretically and empirically that the closer to a new center, the higher the growth rates of both housing prices and population density.

主讲人简介：卜南阳，美国罗彻斯特大学经济学博士，现任教于上海大学悉尼工商学院经济金融系。研究方向是区域与城市经济学，微观经济学等。曾在《Economic Theory》等期刊上发表多篇文章。并且曾参与国家自然科学基金项目《参考点视角下的适应性行为资产定价研究》。