时   间：2023年12月5日（周二） 15:30-17:00

地   点：管理学院史带楼503室

题   目：Information Sale on Network

主讲人：韩立宁 （副研究员，武汉大学）

主持人：从佳佳副教授

摘   要：

This paper studies a stylized model of a monopoly data seller when an information-sharing network exists among data buyers. We show that, if the buyers' prior information is sufficiently noisy, the optimal selling strategy is characterized by a maximum independent set, which is the largest set of buyers who have no information-sharing link with each other. In addition, the precision of the seller's data decreases in the connectivity of the buyer network, and it is larger than the socially efficient level of precision. Our result formalizes the intuition that social learning through an information-sharing network may substitute third-party information provided by a monopoly data seller. Furthermore, we discuss the interventions of the seller on the information-sharing network.

个人简介：

韩立宁，武汉大学经济与管理学院特聘副研究员。主要研究领域为博弈论、网络经济学等。主持教育部人文社科项目，研究成果发表于Games and Economic Behavior。